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Abstract
We present differentially private efficient algorithms for learning union of polygons in the
plane (which are not necessarily convex). Our algorithms achieve (α, β)-PAC learning and (ε, δ)-
differential privacy using a sample of size O˜
(
1
αε
k log d
)
, where the domain is [d] × [d] and k is
the number of edges in the union of polygons.
1 Introduction
Machine learning algorithms have exciting and wide-range potential. However, as the data fre-
quently contain sensitive personal information, there are real privacy concerns associated with the
development and the deployment of this technology. Motivated by this observation, the line of
work on differentially private learning (initiated by [23]) aims to construct learning algorithms that
provide strong (mathematically proven) privacy protections for the training data. Both govern-
ment agencies and industrial companies have realized the importance of introducing strong privacy
protection to statistical and machine learning tasks. A few recent examples include Google [20]
and Apple [27] that are already using differentially private estimation algorithms that feed into
machine learning algorithms, and the US Census Bureau announcement that they will use differ-
entially private data publication techniques in the next decennial census [1]. Differential privacy
is increasingly accepted as a standard for rigorous privacy. We refer the reader to the excellent
surveys in [17] and [28]. The definition of differential privacy is,
Definition 1.1 ([16]). Let A be a randomized algorithm whose input is a sample. Algorithm A is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two samples S, S′ that differ in one example, and for any
event T , we have
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
For now, we can think of a (non-private) learner as an algorithm that operates on a set of
classified random examples, and outputs a hypothesis h that misclassifies fresh examples with
probability at most (say) 110 . A private learner must achieve the same goal while guaranteeing that
the choice of h preserves differential privacy of the sample points. Intuitively this means that the
choice of h should not be significantly affected by any particular sample.
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While many learning tasks of interest are compatible with differential privacy, privacy comes
with a cost (in terms of computational resources and the amount of data needed), and it is important
to understand how efficient can private learning be. Indeed, there has been a significant amount of
work aimed at understanding the sample complexity of private learning [4, 12, 5, 6, 21, 10, 2], the
computational complexity of private learning [11], and studying variations of the private learning
model [7, 9, 13, 3]. However, in spite of the significant progress made in recent years, much remains
unknown and answers to fundamental questions are still missing. In particular, the literature lacks
effective constructions of private learners for specific concept classes of interest, such as halfspaces,
polynomials, d-dimensional balls, and more. We remark that, in principle, every (non-private)
learner that works in the statistical queries (SQ) model of Kearns [24] can be transformed to
preserve differential privacy. However, as the transformation is only tight up to polynomial factors,
and as SQ learners are often much less efficient than their PAC learners counterparts, the resulting
private learners are typically far from practical.
In this work we make an important step towards bringing differentially private learning closer
to practice, and construct an effective algorithm for privately learning simple geometric shapes,
focusing on polygons in the plane. To motivate our work, consider the task of analyzing GPS
navigation data, or the task of learning the shape of a flood or a fire based on users’ location
reports. As user location data might be sensitive, the ability to privately learn such shapes is of
significant importance.
1.1 A Non-Private Learner for Conjunctions and Existing Techniques
Our learner is obtained by designing a private variant for the classical (non-private) learner for
conjunctions using the greedy algorithm for set-cover. Before describing our new learner, we first
quickly recall this non-private technique (see e.g., [25] for more details).
Let CONJk,d denote the class of all conjunctions (i.e., AND) of at most k literals over d Boolean
variables v1, . . . , vd, e.g., v1 ∧ v4 ∧ v5. Here, for a labeled example (~x, σ), the vector ~x ∈ {0, 1}d
is interpreted as an assignment to the d Boolean variables, and σ = 1 iff this assignment satisfies
the target concept. Given a sample S = {(~xi, σi)} of labeled examples, the classical (non-private)
learner for this class begins with the hypothesis h = v1 ∧ v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vd ∧ vd, and then proceeds by
deleting from h any literal that “contradicts” a positively labeled example in S. Observe that at
the end of this process, the set of literals appearing in h contains the set of literals appearing in
the target concept (because a literal is only deleted when it is contradicted by a positively labeled
example).
The next step is to eliminate unnecessary literals from the hypothesis h (in order to guarantee
generalization). Note that removing literals from h might cause it to err on negative example in S,
and hence, the algorithm must carefully choose which of the literals to eliminate. This can be done
using the greedy algorithm for set cover as follows. We have already made sure that each of the
literals in h does not err on positive examples in S (since such literals were deleted), and we know
that there is a choice of k literals from h that together correctly classify all negative examples in S
(since we know that the k literals of the target concept are contained in h). Thus, our task can be
restated as identifying a small number of literals from h that together correctly classify all negative
examples in S. This can be done using the greedy algorithm for set cover, where every literal in h
corresponds to a set, and this set “covers” a negative example if the literal is zero on this example.
To summarize, the algorithm first identifies the collection of all literals that are consistent with
the positive data, and then uses the greedy algorithm for set cover in order to identify a small
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subset of these literals that together correctly classify the negative data. This is a good starting
point for designing a private learner for conjunctions, since the greedy algorithm for set cover has
a private variant [22]. The challenge here is that in the private algorithm of Gupta et al. [22], the
collection of sets from which the cover is chosen is assumed to be fixed and independent of the
input data. In contrast, in our case the collection of sets corresponds to the literals that correctly
classified the positive data, which is data dependent. One might try to overcome this challenge
by first identifying, in a private manner, a collection L of all literals that correctly classify (most
of) the positive data, and then to run the private algorithm of Gupta et al. [22] to choose a small
number of literals from L. However, a direct implementation of this idea would require accounting
for the privacy loss incurred due to each literal in L. As |L| can be linear in d (the number of
possible literals), this would result in an algorithm with sample complexity poly(d). When we
apply this strategy to learn polygons in the plane, d will correspond to the size of an assumed grid
on the plane, which we think of as being very big, e.g., d = 264. Hence, poly(d) sample complexity
is unacceptable.
1.2 Our Results
Our first result is an efficient private learner for conjunctions. Our learner is obtained by modifying
the strategy outlined above to use the greedy algorithm for set cover in order to choose a small
number of literals directly out of the set of all possible 2d literals (instead of choosing them out of
the set of literals that agree with the positive examples). However, this must be done carefully, as
unlike before, we need to ensure that the selected literals will not cause our hypothesis to err on
the positive examples. Specifically, in every step of the greedy algorithm we will aim at choosing a
literal that eliminates (i.e., evaluates to zero on) a lot of the negative examples without eliminating
(essentially) any of the positive examples. In the terminology of the set cover problem, we will have
two types of elements – positive and negative elements – and our goal will be to identify a small
cover of the negative elements that does not cover (essentially) any of the positive elements. We
show,
Theorem 1.2. There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learner for CONJk,d
with sample complexity1 O˜( 1αεk log d).
We remark that our techniques extend to disjunctions of literals in a straightforward way, as
follows.
Theorem 1.3. There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learner for the class
of all disjunctions (i.e., OR) of at most k literals over d Boolean variables with sample complexity
O˜( 1αεk log d).
We then show that our technique can be used to privately learn (not necessarily convex) polygons
in the plane. To see the connection, let us first consider convex polygons, and observe that a convex
polygon with k edges can be represented as the intersection of k halfplanes. Thus, as in our learner
for Boolean conjunctions, if we could identify a halfplane that eliminates (i.e., evaluates to zero
on) a lot of the negative examples without eliminating (essentially) any of the positive examples in
the sample, then we could learn convex polygons in iterations. However, recall that in our learner
1For simplicity we used the O˜ notation to hide logarithmic factors in α, β, ǫ, δ, k. The dependency in these factors
wil be made explicit in the following sections.
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for conjunctions, the parameter d controlled both the description length of examples (since each
example specified an assignment to d variables) and the number of possible literals (which was
2d). Thus, the running time of our algorithm was allowed to be linear in the number of possible
literals. The main challenge when applying this technique to (convex) polygons is that the number
of possible halfplanes (which will correspond to the parameter d) is huge, and our algorithm cannot
run in time linear in the number of possible halfplanes.
To recover from this difficulty, we consider the dual plane in which sample points correspond to
lines, and show that in that dual plane it is possible to (privately) identify a point (that corresponds
to a halfplane in the primal plane) with the required properties (that is, eliminating a lot of negative
examples while not eliminating positive examples). The idea is that since there are only n input
points, in the dual plane there will be only n lines to consider, which partition the dual plane into
at most n2 regions. Now, two different halfplanes in the primal plane correspond to two different
points in the dual plane, and if these two points fall in the same region, then the two halfplanes
behave identically on the input sample. We could therefore partition the halfplanes (in the primal
plane) into at most n2 equivalence classes w.r.t. the way they behave on the input sample. This
fact can be leveraged in order to efficiently implement the algorithm.
Our techniques extend to non-convex polygons, which unlike convex polygons cannot be rep-
resented as intersection of halfplanes. It it well known that every (simple2) polygon with k edges
can be represented as the union of at most k triangles, each of which can be represented as the
intersection of at most 3 halfplanes (as a triangle is a convex polygon with 3 edges). In other
words, a (simple) polygon with k edges can be represented as a DNF formula (i.e., disjunction of
conjunctive clauses) in which each clause has at most 3 literals. As we will see, our techniques can
be extended to capture this case efficiently. Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 1.4 (informal). There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learner
for union of (simple) polygons in the plane with sample complexity O˜( 1αεk log d), where k is the
number of edges in the union of polygons and log d is the description length of examples.
As the greedy algorithm for set cover has many applications in computational learning theory,
we hope that our techniques will continue to find much broader use.
2 Preliminaries
We recall standard definitions from learning theory and differential privacy. In the following X is
some arbitrary domain. A concept (similarly, hypothesis) over domain X is a predicate defined
over X. A concept class (similarly, hypothesis class) is a set of concepts.
Definition 2.1 (Generalization Error). Let D ∈ ∆(X) be a probability distribution over X and let
c : x→ {0, 1} be a concept. The generalization error of a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} w.r.t. D and c
is defined as errorD(c, h) = Prx∼D[h(x) 6= c(x)].
We now recall the notion of PAC learning [29]. Let C and H be a concept class and a hypothesis
class over a domain X, and let A : (X × {0, 1})n → H be an algorithm that operates on a labeled
database and returns a hypothesis from H.
2A simple polygon is one which does not intersect itself.
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Definition 2.2 (PAC Learner [29]). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-PAC learner for concept class C
using hypothesis class H with sample complexity n if for every distribution D over X and for every
fixture of c ∈ C, given a labeled database S = ((xi, c(xi)))ni=1 where each xi is drawn i.i.d. from D,
algorithm A outputs a hypothesis h ∈ H satisfying
Pr [errorD(c, h) > α] ≤ β.
The probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to D and the coin
tosses of the learner A.
Without privacy considerations, the sample complexity of PAC learning is essentially charac-
terized by a combinatorial quantity called the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension:
Definition 2.3. Fix a concept class C over domain X. A set {x1, . . . , xℓ} ∈ X is shattered by
C if for every labeling b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, there exists c ∈ C such that b1 = c(x1), . . . , bℓ = c(xℓ). The
Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of C, denoted VC(C), is the size of the largest set which is
shattered by C.
The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is an important combinatorial measure of a con-
cept class. Classical results in statistical learning theory show that the generalization error of a
hypothesis h and its empirical error (observed on a large enough sample) are similar.
Definition 2.4 (Empirical Error). Let S = ((xi, σi))
n
i=1 ∈ (X × {0, 1})n be a labeled sample. The
empirical error of a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} w.r.t. S is defined as errorS(h) = 1n |{i : h(xi) 6= σi}|.
Theorem 2.5 (VC-Dimension Generalization Bound, e.g. [8]). Let D and C be, respectively, a
distribution and a concept class over a domain X, and let c ∈ C. For a sample S = ((xi, c(xi)))ni=1
where n ≥ 64α (VC(C) ln(64α ) + ln( 8β )) and the xi are drawn i.i.d. from D, it holds that
Pr
[
∃h ∈ C s.t. errorD(h, c) > α ∧ errorS(h) ≤ α
2
]
≤ β.
2.1 Conjunctions and Disjunctions
Definition 2.6. Let H be a concept class over a domain X, and let k ∈ N. We use H∨k to denote
the class of all disjunctions (i.e., OR) of at most k concepts from H, and similarly, we denote H∧k
for the class of all conjunctions (i.e., AND) of at most k concepts from H.
The following observation is standard (see, e.g., [19]).
Observation 2.7. For every concept class H we have
VC(H∨k) ≤ O(k log(k) · VC(H)) and VC(H∧k) ≤ O(k log(k) ·VC(H)).
Our strategy in the following sections for privately learning a concept class C will be to use a
“simpler” concept class H such that for some (hopefully small) k we have C ⊆ H∨k or C ⊆ H∧k.
Example 2.8. Let DISJk,d denote the class of all disjunctions (i.e., OR) of at most k literals over
d Boolean variables, and similarly, let CONJk,d denote the class of all conjunctions (i.e., AND)
of at most k literals over d Boolean variables. Trivially, DISJk,d = (DISJ1,d)
∨k, and CONJk,d =
(CONJ1,d)
∧k.
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2.2 Differential privacy
Two databases S, S′ are called neighboring if they differ on a single entry.
Definition 2.9 (Differential Privacy [16]). Let A be a randomized algorithm whose input is a
database. Let ε, δ ≥ 0. Algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring databases
S, S′ and for any event T ,
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ,
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of the algorithm A. When δ = 0 we omit it and
say that A is ε-differentially private.
Our learning algorithms are designed via repeated applications of differentially private algo-
rithms on a database. Composition theorems for differential privacy show that the price of privacy
for multiple (adaptively chosen) interactions degrades gracefully.
Theorem 2.10 (Composition of Differential Privacy [14, 15, 18]). Let 0 < ε, δ′ < 1 and δ ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose an algorithm A accesses its input database S only through m adaptively chosen executions
of (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms. Then A is
1. (mε,mδ)-differentially private, and
2. (ε′,mδ + δ′)-differentially private for ε =
√
2m ln(1/δ′) · ε+ 2mε2.
The most basic constructions of differentially private algorithms are via the Laplace mechanism
as follows.
Definition 2.11 (The Laplace Distribution). A random variable has probability distribution Lap(b)
if its probability density function is f(x) = 12b exp(− |x|b ), where x ∈ R.
Definition 2.12 (Sensitivity). A f mapping databases to the reals has sensitivity s if for every
neighboring S, S, it holds that |f(S)− f(S′)| ≤ s.
Theorem 2.13 (The Laplacian Mechanism [16]). Let f be a sensitivity s function. The mechanism
A that on input a database S adds noise with distribution Lap(sε) to the output of f(S) preserves
ε-differential privacy. Moreover,
Pr
[
|A(S)− f(S)| > ∆
]
≤ exp
(
−ǫ∆
s
)
.
We next describe the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [26]. Given a database S,
the exponential mechanism privately chooses a “good” solution h out of a set of possible solutions
H (in our context, H will be a hypothesis class). This “goodness” is quantified using a quality
function that matches solutions to scores.
Definition 2.14 (Quality function). A quality function q = q(S, h) maps a database S and a
solution h ∈ H to a real number, identified as the score of the solution h w.r.t. the database S. We
say that q has sensitivity s if q(·, h) has sensitivity s for every h ∈ H.
Given a sensitivity-1 quality function q and a database S, the exponential mechanism chooses
a solution h ∈ H with probability proportional to exp (ǫ · q(S, h)/2).
Proposition 2.15 (Properties of the exponential mechanism). (i) The exponential mechanism is
ε-differentially private. (ii) Let λ > 0. The exponential mechanism outputs a solution h such that
q(S, h) ≤ maxf∈H{q(S, f)} − λ with probability at most |H| · exp(−ελ/2).
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Algorithm SetCoverLearner
Settings: Concept classes C,H and an integer k ∈ N such that C ⊆ H∧k.
Input: Labeled sample S = {(xi, σi)}ni=1 ∈ (X × {0, 1})n, privacy parameter ε.
Tool used: A selection procedure A that takes a database S and a quality function q (that assigns
a score to each hypothesis in H), and returns a hypothesis h ∈ H.
1. For j = 1 to 2k log 2α
(a) Let S1 and S0 denote the set of positive and negative examples in S, respectively.
(b) For h ∈ H let #h→0(S1) and #h→0(S0) denote the number of positive and negative
examples in S, respectively, that h labels as 0. That is,
#h→0(S1) = |{xi ∈ S1 : h(xi) = 0}| and #h→0(S0) = |{xi ∈ S0 : h(xi) = 0}|.
(c) Let wj ←
⌊
Lap
(
2k
ε log
2
α
)⌋
and set bj = |S0|+ wj − 2kε log
(
2
α
)
log
(
2k
β log
2
α
)
.
(d) For every h ∈ H, define q(h) = min
{
#h→0(S0)− bjk , −#h→0(S1)
}
.
(e) Let hj ← A(S, q), and delete from S every (xi, σi) such that hj(xi) = 0.
2. Return the hypothesis hfin = h1 ∧ h2 ∧ · · · ∧ h2k log 2
α
.
3 A Generic Construction via Set Cover
In this section we present our generic construction for privately learning a concept class C contain-
ing concepts that can be written as the conjunction or the disjunction of functions in a (hopefully
simpler) class H. For readability we focus on conjunctions. The extension to disjunction is straight-
forward.
Claim 3.1. Fix a target function c∗ ∈ C, and consider the execution of SetCoverLearner on a
sample S = {(xi, c∗(xi))}ni=1. Assume that every run of the selection procedure A in Step 1e returns
a hypothesis hj s.t. q(hj) ≥ maxf∈H{q(f)} − λ. Then, with probability at least 1 − β it holds that
hfin errs on at most max
{
αn
2 ,
8k
ε log
(
2
α
)
log
(
2k
β log
2
α
)}
+ 4kλ log 2α example in S.
Proof. First observe that there are 2k log 2α draws from Lap
(
2k
ε log
2
α
)
throughout the execution.
By the properties of the Laplace distribution, with probability at least 1 − β it holds that the
maximum absolute value of these random variables is at most ∆ = 2kε log
(
2
α
)
log
(
2k
β log
2
α
)
. We
continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. In particular, this means that in every
iteration j we have |S0| − 2∆ ≤ bj ≤ |S0|. Thus, in every iteration there exists a hypothesis h˜ ∈ H
with q(h˜) ≥ 0. To see this, recall that the target concept c∗ can be written as c∗ = h∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ h∗k
for h∗1, . . . , h
∗
k ∈ H. Hence, in every iteration j there is a hypothesis h˜ ∈ H that correctly classifies
all of the (remaining) positive points in S while correctly classifying at least 1/k fraction of the
(remaining) negative points in S, i.e., at least |S0|/k ≥ bj/k negative points. Such a hypothesis h˜
satisfies q(h˜) = 0. By our assumption on the selection procedure A, we therefore have that in each
iteration j, the selection procedure identifies a hypothesis hj s.t. q(hj) ≥ −λ.
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By the definition of q, in every iteration j we have that the selected hj misclassifies at most λ
of the remaining positive examples in S. Therefore, hfin misclassifies at most 2kλ log
2
α positive
examples in S. Moreover, in every iteration j s.t. |S0| ≥ 2kλ + 4∆ we have that hj classifies
correctly at least 12k fraction of the negative examples in S. To see this, observe that as q(hj) ≥ −λ
we have
#hj→0(S
0) ≥ bj
k
− λ ≥ |S
0| − 2∆
k
− λ ≥ |S
0|
2k
.
That is, either there exists an iteration j in which number of negative points in S drops be-
low 2kλ + 4∆, or every iteration shrinks the number of negative examples by a factor of 12k , in
which case after 2k log 2α iterations there could be at most
αn
2 negative points in S. Observe that
hfin does not err on negative points that were removed from S, and therefore, there could be
at most max
{
αn
2 , 2kλ+ 4∆
}
negative points on which hfin errs. Overall, hfin errs on at most
max
{
αn
2 , 4∆
}
+ 4kλ log 2α points in S.
Claim 3.1 ensures that if at every step A picks hj of high quality, then (w.h.p.) algorithm
SetCoverLearner returns a hypothesis from H∧2k log
2
α with low empirical error. Combining this
with standard generalization bounds and with Observation 2.7 (that bounds the VC dimension of
H∧2k log
2
α ) we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let C,H, k be two concept classes and an integer such that C ⊆ H∧k. Let A be
a selection procedure that takes a database S and a quality function q, and returns a hypothesis
h ∈ H such that q(hj) ≥ maxf∈H{q(f)}−λ with probability at least 1− β4k log(2/α) . Then, algorithm
SetCoverLearner with A as the selection procedure is an (α, β)-PAC learner for C with sample
complexity
n = Θ
(
k log 1α
α
(
VC(H) log(k) + λ+
1
ε
log
(
k
β
log
1
α
)))
.
3.1 Tuning the selection procedure
If H is finite, then one could directly implement the selection procedure A using the exponential
mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [26] to find a hypothesis hj with large q(hj) at each iteration.
In order to guarantee that all of the ≈ k iterations of algorithm SetCoverLearner satisfy together
(ε, δ)-differential privacy, it suffices that each application of the exponential mechanism satisfies εˆ ≈
ε√
k
-differential privacy (see Theorem 2.10). When choosing such an εˆ, the exponential mechanism
identifies, in every iteration, an hj such that
q(j) & max
f∈H
{q(f)} − 1
εˆ
log |H| ≈ max
f∈H
{q(f)} −
√
k
ε
log |H|.
This gives a selection procedure A which selects hj with q(hj) ≥ maxf∈H{q(f)} − λ, for λ ≈√
k
ε log |H|.
Example 3.3. There exist efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learners for CONJk,d
and for DISJk,d with sample complexity n = Θ˜
(
1
αε · k1.5 log d
)
.
The reason for the dependency in k1.5 in the above example, is that for the privacy analysis we
wanted to ensure that each iteration was differentially private with parameter ≈ ε/
√
k (because
8
when composing ℓ differentially private mechanisms the privacy budget deteriorates proportionally
to
√
ℓ). This resulted in ≈ √k/ε misclassified points per iteration (and there are ≈ k iterations). As
we next explain, in our case, the privacy parameter does not need to deteriorate with the number
of iterations, which allows us to improve the sample complexity by a
√
k factor. Our approach to
proving this improved bound builds on the analysis of Gupta et al. [22] for their private algorithm for
set cover. The main difference is that we have both positive and negative examples, which we need
to handle differently. As we next explain, this will be achieved using Step 1c of SetCoverLearner.
Claim 3.4. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and δ < 1/e. Instantiating SetCoverLearner with the exponential
mechanism as the selection procedure A with privacy parameter εˆ = ε2 ln(e/δ) (for each iteration)
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
We first present an intuitive (and oversimplified) overview of the proof. Consider two neighbor-
ing databases S and S′ such that S′ = S ∪ {(x∗, σ∗)}, and let us focus this intuitive overview on
the case where σ∗ = 0. Fix a possible output ~h = (h1, h2, . . . , h2k log 2
α
) of SetCoverLearner. We
will analyze the ratio
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h]
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h]
. (1)
Let t be such that ht is the first hypothesis in this output vector satisfying ht(x
∗) = 0. Observe
that after the tth iteration, the executions on S and on S′ continue exactly the same, since (x∗, σ∗)
is removed from S′ during the tth iteration (because in every iteration we remove all input elements
on which the selected hypothesis evaluates to 0). Intuitively, if t is small then we only need to pay
(in the privacy analysis) for a small number of iterations. In general, however, t might be as large
as 2k log 2α , and accounting for that many iterations in the privacy analysis is exactly what we are
trying to avoid.
Recall that each iteration j of SetCoverLearner draws a random noise wj from
⌊
Lap
(
2k
ε log
2
α
)⌋
.
Let us denote these noises as they are in the execution on S as ~w = (w1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
) and in the
execution on S′ as ~w′ = (w′1, . . . , w
′
2k log 2
α
). Furthermore, let us assume that w′j = wj − 1 for
every j ≤ t and that w′j = wj for every j > t. By the properties of the Laplace distribution,
this assumption distorts our bound on the ratio in expression (1) by at most an eε factor. (In
a sense, for these random noises we do account for all 2k log 2α potential iterations by sampling
random noises with larger variance. However, this larger variance is mitigated by the fact that in
the quality function q we divide noises by k, and hence, we do not incurr an increase of poly(k) in
the sample complexity due to this issue.)
We have already established that after the tth iteration, the two executions are identical. In
addition, due to our assumption on ~w and ~w′, during the first t iterations, the only hypotheses
with different qualities (between the execution on S and on S′) or those hypotheses that label x∗
as 0. This is because if a hypothesis h labels x∗ as 1, then (x∗, 0) only effects the quality q(h) via
the noisy estimation for the size of S0 (denoted as bj in the algorithm), which by our assumption
on ~w and ~w′ is the same in the two executions (because the difference in the noise cancels out the
difference in |S0|). To summarize, after conditioning on ~w and ~w′, the additional example (x∗, 0)
causes the two executions to differ only in their first t iterations, and within these t iterations it
affects only the qualities of the hypotheses that label x∗ as zero. This can be formalized to bound
the ratio in expression (1) by .
∏t
j=1 exp (ε · pj), where pj is the probability that a hypothesis that
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labels x∗ as 0 is chosen at step j of the algorithm. The proof then concludes by arguing that if
these probabilities {pj} are small then they reduce our privacy costs (since they multiply ε), and if
these probabilities {pj} are large then the index t should be small (since we are likely to identify
a hypothesis that labels x∗ as zero quickly, and t is the index of the first such hypothesis), and
therefore we must only account for the privacy loss incurred during a small number of iterations.
We now proceed with the formal proof.
Proof of Claim 3.4. Let S and S′ be two neighboring databases such that S△S′ = {(x∗, σ∗)}.
Fix a possible output of SetCoverLearner ~h = (h1, h2, . . . , h2k log 2
α
), and let qj,S,wj(h) denote the
quality q(h) of a hypothesis h ∈ H during the jth iteration of the algorithm when running on S,
conditioned on h1, . . . , hj−1 being chosen in the previous steps and on the value of wj . Let t be
such that ht is the first hypothesis in ~h satisfying ht(x
∗) = 0.
Case (a): S′ = S ∪ {(x∗, σ∗)} and σ∗ = 1. Fix a noise vector ~w. We can calculate
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h|~w]
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h|~w]
=
2k log 2
α∏
j=1

 exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(hj))/
(∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f))
)
exp(εˆ · qj,S′,wj(hj))/
(∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S′,wj(f))
)


=
exp(εˆ · qt,S,wt(ht))
exp(εˆ · qt,S′,wt(ht))
·
t∏
j=1
(∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S′,wj(f))∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f))
)
After t, the remaining elements in S and S′ are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover,
except for the tth term, the numerators of both the top and the bottom expressions cancel, since
all the relevant scores are equal.
We are currently assuming that S′ = S ∪ {(x∗, σ∗)} and σ∗ = 1. Hence, for every hypothesis
f and every step j we have that qj,S,wj(f) − 1 ≤ qj,S′,wj(f) ≤ qj,S,wj(f), since adding a positive
example to the database can decrease the quality by at most 1 (and it cannot increase the quality).
Hence, the first term above is at most exp(εˆ), and the second term is at most 1. As this holds for
every possible value of the noise vector ~w, we get that
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h]
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h]
≤ exp(εˆ).
Case (b): S′ = S ∪ {(x∗, σ∗)} and σ∗ = 0. Fix a noise vector ~w, and let ~w′ be such that
w′j = wj − 1 for every j ≤ t and w′j = wj for every j > t. (Recall that t is the index of the first
hypothesis in the output vector ~h that labels x∗ as 0.) We have that
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h|~w]
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h|~w′]
=
2k log 2
α∏
j=1

 exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(hj))/
(∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f))
)
exp(εˆ · qj,S′,w′
j
(hj))/
(∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S′,w′j(f))
)


=
exp(εˆ · qt,S,wt(ht))
exp(εˆ · qt,S′,w′t(ht))
·
t∏
j=1
(∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S′,w′j(f))∑
f∈H exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f))
)
As before, after t the remaining elements in S and S′ are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel
(recall that wj = w
′
j for every j > t). In addition, due to our choice of w
′
j = wj − 1 for every
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j ≤ t, we again get that, except for the tth term, the numerators of both the top and the bottom
expression cancel, since all the relevant scores are equal.
We are currently analyzing the case where S′ = S ∪ {(x∗, σ∗)} and σ∗ = 0. Hence, the first
term above is exp(−εˆ) < 1, because qt,S′,w′t(ht) = qt,S,wt(ht) + 1. Moreover, for every j ≤ t we
have that w′j = wj − 1. Hence, for every j ≤ t and every hypothesis f s.t. f(x∗) = 1 we have
qj,S′,w′t(f) = qj,S,wt(f). Also, for every j ≤ t and every hypothesis f s.t. f(x∗) = 0 we have
qj,S′,w′t(f) = qj,S,wt(f) + 1. Therefore we have
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h|~w]
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h|~w′]
≤
t∏
j=1


(exp(εˆ)− 1) · ∑
f∈H:
f(x∗)=0
exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f)) +
∑
f∈H
exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f))
∑
f∈H
exp(εˆ · qj,S,wj(f))


=
t∏
j=1
(1 + (exp(εˆ)− 1) · pj(S,wj)) (2)
where pj(S,wj) is the probability that a hypothesis that labels x
∗ as 0 is chosen at step j of the
algorithm running on S, conditioned on picking the hypotheses h1, . . . , hj−1 in the previous steps,
and on the noise wj .
For an instance S and an example x∗, we say that an output ~h = (h1, . . . , h2k log 2
α
) is λ-bad
if
∑2k log 2
α
j=1 pj(S,wj) · 1{h1(x∗) = h2(x∗) = · · · = hj(x∗) = 1} > λ, where pj(S,wj) is as defined
above. We call the output ~h λ-good otherwise. We first consider the case when the output ~h is
ln(1/δ)-good. By the definition of t we have
t−1∑
j=1
pj(S,wj) ≤ ln(1/δ).
Then we can bound the expression (2) by
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h|~w]
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h|~w′]
≤
t∏
j=1
(1 + (exp(εˆ)− 1) · pj(S,wj))
≤ exp

2εˆ · t∑
j=1
pj(S,wj)


≤ exp (2εˆ · (ln(1/δ) + pt(S,wt)))
≤ exp (2εˆ · (ln(1/δ) + 1))
≤ exp(ε).
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So, for every ln(1/δ)-good output ~h for S we have
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h]
=
∑
w1,...,wt,
wt+1,...,w2k log 2α
Pr
[
w1, . . . , wt,
wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
· Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h
∣∣∣∣∣ w1, . . . , wt,wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
=
∑
w1,...,wt,
wt+1,...,w2k log 2α
Pr
[
w1 + 1, . . . , wt + 1,
wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
· Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h
∣∣∣∣∣ w1 + 1, . . . , wt + 1,wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
≤
∑
w1,...,wt,
wt+1,...,w2k log 2α
eε · Pr
[
w1, . . . , wt,
wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
· Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S) = ~h
∣∣∣∣∣ w1 + 1, . . . , wt + 1,wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
≤
∑
w1,...,wt,
wt+1,...,w2k log 2α
eε · Pr
[
w1, . . . , wt,
wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
· eε · Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h
∣∣∣∣∣ w1, . . . , wt,wt+1, . . . , w2k log 2
α
]
= e2ε · Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~h]
As for a ln(1/δ)-bad output, the following lemma shows the probability that SetCoverLearner(S)
outputs a ln(1/δ)-bad output (for S) is at most δ.
Lemma 3.5 ([22]). Consider the following n round probabilistic process. In each round, an adver-
sary chooses a pj ∈ [0, 1] possibly based on the first (j − 1) rounds and a coin is tossed with heads
probability pj. Let Zj be the indicator for the the event that no coin comes up heads in the first j
steps. Let Y denote the random variable
∑n
j=1 pjZj. Then for any y we have Pr[Y > y] ≤ exp(−y).
Specifically, to map our setting to that of Lemma 3.5, consider running SetCoverLearner as
follows. When choosing a hypothesis hj in step j, the algorithm first tosses a coin whose heads
probability is pj(S,wj) to decide whether to pick a hypothesis that labels x
∗ as 0 or not. Then
it uses a second source of randomness to determine the hypothesis hj itself, sampling with the
appropriate conditional probabilities based on the outcome of the coin.
Thus, for any set F of outcomes, we have
Pr[SetCoverLearner(S) ∈ F ] =
∑
~f∈F
Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S) = ~f
]
=
∑
~f∈F :~f is
ln(1/δ)-bad
for S
Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S) = ~f
]
+
∑
~f∈F :~f is
ln(1/δ)-good
for S
Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S) = ~f
]
≤ δ +
∑
~f∈F :~f is
ln(1/δ)-good for S
e2ε · Pr
[
SetCoverLearner(S′) = ~f
]
≤ e2ε · Pr[SetCoverLearner(S′) ∈ F ] + δ.
A similar analysis holds for the case where S = S′ ∪ {(x∗, σ∗)}.
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For example, by combining Claim 3.4 with Claim 3.1, we get improved learners for conjunctions
and disjunctions:
Theorem 3.6. There exist efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learners for CONJk,d
and DISJk,d with sample complexity n = O˜
(
1
αε · k log d
)
.
4 Convex Polygons in the Plane
In this section we show how our generic construction from the previous section applies to convex
polygons in a (discrete version of the) Euclidean plane. This is an important step towards our
construction for (not necessarily convex) polygons.
We represent a convex polygon with k edges as the intersection of k halfplanes. A halfplane
over R2 can be represented using 3 parameters a, b, c ∈ R with fa,b,c(x, y) = 1 iff cy ≥ ax + b.
Denote the set of all such halfplanes over R2 as
HALFPLANE = {fa,b,c : a, b, c ∈ R}, where fa,b,c(x, y) = 1 iff cy ≥ ax+ b.
We can now define the class of convex polygons with k edges over R2 as
CONVEX-k-GON = HALFPLANE∧k .
For a parameter d ∈ N, let Xd = {0, 1, 2, . . . , d}, and let X2d = (Xd)2 denote a discretization of
the Euclidean plane, in which each axis consists of the points in Xd. We assume that our examples
are from X2d . Hence, as explained next, we are able to represent a halfplane using only two real
parameters a, b ∈ R and a bit z ∈ {±1}. The parameters a and b define the line y = ax + b, and
the parameter z determines whether the halfplane is “above” or “below” the line. In other words,
fa,b,z(x, y) = 1 iff zy ≥ z(ax + b). Even though in this representation we do not capture vertical
lines, for our purposes, vertical lines will not be needed. The reason is that when the examples
come from the discretization X2d , a vertical line can always be replaced with a non-vertical line
such that the corresponding halfplanes behave exactly the same on all of X2d . Moreover, since the
discretization X2d is finite, it suffices to consider bounded real valued parameters a, b ∈ [−2d2, 2d2]
(see Observation 4.2 below). Actually, by letting a reside in a bigger range, we can encode the
bit z in a, and represent a halfplane using only two real numbers. We denote the set of all such
halfplanes as
HALFPLANEd =
{
faˆ,b : −2d2 ≤ aˆ ≤ 6d2, −2d2 ≤ b ≤ 2d2
}
,
where faˆ,b(x, y) = 1 iff zy ≥ z(ax+ b) for a = aˆ− 4d2 · 1{aˆ>2d2} and z = 1− 2 · 1{aˆ>2d2}.
Observation 4.1. Let a, b ∈ [−2d2, 2d2] and z ∈ {±1}, and define fa,b,z(x, y) = 1 iff zy ≥ z(ax+b).
Then, there exists an fˆ ∈ HALFPLANEd such that fˆ ≡ fa,b,z(x, y).
Proof sketch. If z = 1 then define aˆ = a. Otherwise, if z = −1 then define aˆ = a + 4d2. Observe
that in both cases faˆ,b ∈ HALFPLANEd is equivalent to fa,b,z.
Observation 4.2. For every f ∈ HALFPLANE there exists an fˆ ∈ HALFPLANEd such that for every
(x, y) ∈ X2d we have f(x, y) = fˆ(x, y).
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Proof sketch. Let f ∈ HALFPLANE. By Observation 4.1, it suffices to show that there exists a
halfplane fˆa,b,z equivalent to f of the form fˆa,b,z(x, y) = 1 iff zy ≥ z(ax+b), where a, b ∈ [−2d2, 2d2].
Without loss of generality, we may assume that f “touches” two points (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ X2d , as
otherwise we could “tilt” f to make it so without effecting the way it labels points in X2d . Hence,
f can be defined by the line equation (y − y1)(x2 − x1) = (y2 − y1)(x − x1), together with a bit
z ∈ {±1} that determines whether the halfplane is “above” or “below” that line. First observe that
if x1 6= x2, then this line equation can be rewritten as
y =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1x+
(
y1 − x1 y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
, ax+ b,
where a, b ∈ [−d2, d2] because x1, y1, x2, y2 ∈ Xd and x1 6= x2. That is, the halfplane f can be
defined as f(x, y) = 1 iff zy ≥ z(ax+ b), as required. Next note that if x1 = x2, then f is described
by the vertical line x = x1 and a bit z ∈ {±1}, where f(x, y) = 1 iff zx ≥ zx1. Now consider
the line that passes through (x1, 0) and (x1 + 0.5, d), and a line that passes through (x1, 0) and
(x1 − 0.5, d). One of these two lines, depending on z, defines a halfplane that splits X2d identically
to f . Such a line can be described as zy = z(ax+ b) for a, b ∈ [−2d2, 2d2].
Remark 4.3. We think of the discretization size d as a large number, e.g., d = 264. The runtime
and the sample complexity of our algorithms is at most logarithmic in d.
A consequence of Observation 4.2 is that, in order to learn CONVEX-k-GON over examples in X2d ,
it suffices to describe a learner for the class HALFPLANE∧kd over examples in X
2
d . As we next explain,
this can be done using our techniques from Section 3. Concretely, we need to specify the selection
procedure used in Step 1e of algorithm SetCoverLearner, for privately choosing a hypothesis from
HALFPLANEd. Our selection procedure appears in algorithm SelectHalfplane.
Privacy analysis of SelectHalfplane. Consider running algorithm SelectHalfplane with a
score function q whose sensitivity is (at most) 1, and observe that, as in the standard analysis of
the exponential mechanism [26], algorithm SelectHalfplane satisfies 2ε-differential privacy. To
see this, fix two neighboring databases S, S′, and denote the probability density functions in the
execution on S and on S′ as pS(aˆ, b) and pS′(aˆ, b), respectively. Since q is of sensitivity 1, for
every (aˆ, b) ∈ [−2d2, 6d2] × [−2d2, 2d2] we have that pS(aˆ, b) ≤ e2εpS′(aˆ, b). Hence, for any set of
possible outcomes F we have Pr[SelectHalfplane(S) ∈ F ] ≤ e2ε · Pr[SelectHalfplane(S′) ∈ F ],
as required. Moreover, a similar analysis to that of Claim 3.4 shows the following.
Claim 4.4. When instantiating algorithm SetCoverLearner with SelectHalfplane as the selec-
tion procedure, in order for the whole execution to satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy, it suffices to
execute each instance of SelectHalfplane with a privacy parameter εˆ = O (ε/ log(1/δ)).
4.1 Utility analysis of SelectHalfplane
In algorithm SelectHalfplane we identify points in X2d with lines in D
2 and vice verse. The
following observation states that if two points in D2 belong to the same region (as defined in
Step 3) then these two points correspond to halfplanes in X2d that agree on every point in the input
sample S. This allows us to partition the halfplanes (in the primal plane) into a small number of
equivalence classes.
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Algorithm SelectHalfplane
Input: Labeled sample S = {((xi, yi), σi)}ni=1 ∈ (X2d × {±1})n, privacy parameter ε, quality
function q : HALFPLANEd → R.
1. Denote D =
[−2d2, 2d2] and F = [−2d2, 6d2]. We will refer to the axes of D2 and of F ×D
as a and b.
2. Identify every example ((x, y), σ) ∈ S with the line ℓx,y in D2 defined by the equation y =
xa + b, where a, b are the variables and x, y are the coefficients. Denote Sdual = {ℓx,y :
((x, y), σ) ∈ S}.
3. Let R = {r11 , r12, . . . , r1|R|} denote the partition of D2 into regions defined by the lines in Sdual.
Also let R′ = {r21 , . . . , r2|R|} be a partition of [2d2, 6d2] × D identical to R except that it is
shifted by 4d2 on the a axis. Denote Rˆ = R ∪R′.
% Note that, by induction, n lines can divide the plane into at most n2 different regions. Hence, |R| is small.
4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|, let wi denote the area of region r1i (which is the same as the area of
r2i ), and let (a
1
i , b
1
i ) ∈ r1i and (a2i , b2i ) ∈ r2i be arbitrary points in these regions.
5. Denote N =
∑
rji∈Rˆ wi · exp(ε · q(faji ,bji )), where faji ,bji is a halfplane in HALFPLANEd.
6. Choose and return a pair (aˆ, b) ∈ [−2d2, 6d2] × [−2d2, 2d2] with probability density function
p(aˆ, b) = 1N · exp(ε · q(faˆ,b)).
% Note that for every (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ rji in the same region we have q(fa,b) = q(fa′,b′) (see Observation 4.5).
Hence, this step can be implemented by first selecting a region rji ∈ Rˆ with probability proportional to
wi · exp(ε · q(faj
i
,b
j
i
)), and then selecting a random (a, b) ∈ rji uniformly.
Observation 4.5. Consider the execution of SelectHalfplane on a sample S, and let Rˆ = {rji }
be the regions defined in Step 3 (for j ∈ {1, 2}). For every region rji ∈ Rˆ, for every two points in
this region (a1, b1), (a2, b2) ∈ rji , and for every example (x, y) in the sample S we have fa1,b1(x, y) =
fa2,b2(x, y).
Proof. Fix two points (a1, b1), (a2, b2) that belong to the same region in Rˆ. By the definition of the
regions in Rˆ, for every example (x, y) in the sample S we have that
y ≥ a1x+ b1 iff y ≥ a2x+ b2,
and hence, fa1,b1(x, y) = 1 iff fa2,b2(x, y) = 1.
In particular, Observation 4.5 shows that the function p defined in Step 6 indeed defines a
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probability density function, as for F = [−2d2, 6d2] and D = [−2d2, 2d2] we have∫
F×D
p(a, b) d2(a, b) =
∑
rji∈Rˆ
∫
rji
p(a, b) d2(a, b) =
∑
rji∈Rˆ
∫
rji
exp(ε · q(fa,b))
N
d2(a, b)
=
∑
rji∈Rˆ
∫
rji
exp(ε · q(f
aji ,b
j
i
))
N
d2(a, b) =
∑
rji∈Rˆ
exp(ε · q(f
aji ,b
j
i
))
N
∫
rji
1 d2(a, b)
=
∑
rji∈Rˆ
wi · exp(ε · q(faji ,bji ))
N
= 1.
We also need to argue about the area of the region in the dual plane that corresponds to
hypotheses with high quality (as the probability of a choosing a hypotheses from that region is
proportional to its area). This is done in the following claim.
Claim 4.6. Consider the execution of SelectHalfplane on a sample S, and let w1, . . . , w|R| denote
the areas of the regions defined in Step 3. Then for every i we have that wi ≥ d−4/4.
Proof. We will show that every two different vertices of the regions in R are at distance at least
1/d2, and hence, the minimal possible area is that of a equilateral triangle with edge length 1/d2,
which has area
√
3
4d4
.
To show this lower bound on the distance between a pair of vertices, let ℓx1,y1 , ℓx2,y2 , ℓx3,y3 , ℓx4,y4
be 4 lines in Sdual, and assume that ℓx1,y1 and ℓx2,y2 intersect at (a1,2, b1,2), and that ℓx3,y3 and
ℓx4,y4 intersect at (a3,4, b3,4). Moreover, assume that these two intersection points are different. We
can write the coordinates of these intersection points as
a1,2 =
y1 − y2
x1 − x2 , b1,2 = y1 − x1 ·
y1 − y2
x1 − x1 ,
a3,4 =
y3 − y4
x3 − x4 , b3,4 = y3 − x3 ·
y3 − y4
x3 − x4 .
Now if a1,2 6= a3,4, then
‖(a1,2, b1,2)− (a3,4, b3,4)‖2 ≥ |a1,2 − a3,4| =
∣∣∣∣ y1 − y2x1 − x2 −
y3 − y4
x3 − x4
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(y1 − y2)(x3 − x4)− (y3 − y4)(x1 − x2)(x1 − x2)(x3 − x4)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1d2 ,
and if a1,2 = a3,4, then
‖(a1,2, b1,2)− (a3,4, b3,4)‖2 ≥ |b1,2 − b3,4| = |y1 − y3 − a1,2(x1 − x3)| ≥ 1
d
.
The following lemma states the utility guarantees of SelectHalfplane.
Lemma 4.7. Consider the execution of SelectHalfplane on a sample S, and assume that there
exists a hypothesis f ∈ HALFPLANEd with q(f) ≥ λ. Then the probability that SelectHalfplane
outputs a hypothesis f ′ with q(f ′) < λ− 8ε ln(2dβ ) is at most β.
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Proof. Denote F = [−2d2, 6d2] and D = [−2d2, 2d2]. Let Rˆ = {r11 , r21, . . . , r1|R|, r2|R|} denote the
regions defined in Step 3, and let B ⊆ Rˆ denote the subset of all regions s.t. the halfplanes that
correspond to points in these regions have quality less than λ− 8ε ln(2dβ ). Then the probability that
SelectHalfplane outputs a hypothesis f ′ with q(f ′) < λ− 8ε ln(2dβ ) is at most
∑
r∈B
∫
r
p(a, b) d2(a, b) ≤
∑
r∈B
∫
r
exp(ελ− 8 ln(2dβ ))
N
d2(a, b)
≤
exp(ελ− 8 ln(2dβ )) · area (F ×D)
N
=
exp(ελ− 8 ln(2dβ )) · 32d4
N
≤
exp(ελ− 8 ln(2dβ )) · 32d4
1/(4d4) · exp(ελ) = 128d
8 exp(−8 ln(2d/β)) ≤ β.
Combining Lemma 4.7 with Claims 3.1 and 4.4 yields our private learners for convex polygons:
Theorem 4.8. There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learner for CONVEX-k-GON
over examples from X2d with sample complexity
O
(
k
αǫ
log
(
1
α
)
log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
dk
β
log
1
α
))
.
5 Extension to Union of Non-Convex Polygons
In this section we briefly describe how our techniques from the previous sections can be used to
learn the class of (simple) polygons in the plane, as defined next. For a simple and closed curve3
C, we use interior(C) to denote the union of C and its bounded area. We define the class of all
polygons in the plane with (at most) k edges as
k-GON =
{
interior(C) :
C is a simple and closed curve in R2,
consisting of at most k line segments
}
.
By standard arguments in computational geometry, every such polygon with k edges can be
represented as the union of at most k triangles, each of which can be represented as the intersection
of at most 3 halfplanes (since a triangle is a convex polygon with 3 edges). Let us denote the class
of all triangles in the plane as TRIANGLE. Hence,
k-GON ⊆ TRIANGLE∨k ⊆ (HALFPLANE∧3)∨k .
Thus, in order to learn polygons with k edges, it suffices to construct a learner for the class(
HALFPLANE
∧3)∨k. In fact, this class captures unions of polygons with a total of at most k edges.
In addition, similar arguments to those given in Section 4 show that if input examples come from
X2d = {0, 1, . . . , d}2, then it suffices to construct a learner for
(
HALFPLANE
∧3
d
)∨k
, which we can do
using our techniques from Sections 3 and 4.
3A curve is simple and closed if it does not cross itself and ends at the same point where it begins.
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Algorithm SelectTriangle
Input: Labeled sample S = {((xi, yi), σi)}ni=1 ∈ (X2d × {±1})n, privacy parameter ε, quality
function q : HALFPLANE∧3d → R.
1. Denote D =
[−2d2, 2d2] and F = [−2d2, 6d2]. We will refer to the axes of D2 and of F ×D
as a and b.
2. Identify every example ((x, y), σ) ∈ S with the line ℓx,y in D2 defined by the equation y =
xa + b, where a, b are the variables and x, y are the coefficients. Denote Sdual = {ℓx,y :
((x, y), σ) ∈ S}.
3. Let R = {r11 , r12, . . . , r1|R|} denote the partition of D2 into regions defined by the lines in Sdual.
Also let R′ = {r21, . . . , r2|R|} be a partition of
[
2d2, 6d2
] × D identical to R except that it is
shifted by 4d2 on the a axis. Denote Rˆ = R ∪R′.
4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|, let wi denote the area of region r1i (which is the same as the area of
r2i ), and let (a
1
i , b
1
i ) ∈ r1i and (a2i , b2i ) ∈ r2i be arbitrary points in these regions.
5. Denote N =
∑
r
j1
i1
,r
j2
i2
,r
j3
i3
∈Rˆ wi1 ·wi2 ·wi3 · exp(ε · q(faj1i1 ,bj1i1 ∧ faj2i2 ,bj2i2 ∧ faj3i3 ,bj3i3 )), where fajℓiℓ ,b
jℓ
iℓ
is
a halfplane in HALFPLANEd.
6. Choose and return a random tuple (a1, b1, a2, b2, a3, b3) ∈ (F ×D)3 with probability density
function p : (F×D)3 → R defined as p(a1, b1, a2, b2, a3, b3) = 1N ·exp(ε·q(fa1 ,b1∧fa2,b2∧fa3,b3)).
First, as we mentioned, a straightforward modification to algorithm SetCoverLearner yields
an algorithm for learning classes of the form C ⊆ H∨k (instead of C ⊆ H∧k as stated in Section 3).
Now, to get an efficient construction, we need to specify the selection procedure for choosing a
hypothesis hj ∈ HALFPLANE∧3d in each step of SetCoverLearner. As before, given an input sample
S we consider the dual plane D2 s.t. every input example in S from the primal plane corresponds
to a line in the dual plane, and every point from the dual plane corresponds to a halfplane in the
primal plane. Recall that in the previous section we identified a hypothesis (which was a halfplane)
with a point in the dual plane. The modification is that now a hypothesis is a triangle which we
identify with three points in the dual plane (these 3 points correspond to 3 halfplanes in the primal
plane, whose intersection is a triangle). Our modified selection procedure is presented as algorithm
SelectTriangle.
We use k-UNION-GON to denote the class of all unions of (simple) polygons with a total of at
most k edges. That is, every hypothesis h ∈ k-UNION-GON can be written as h = h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hm for
(h1, . . . , hm) ∈ (k1-GON× · · · × km-GON) where k1 + · · · + km ≤ k. A similar analysis to that of the
previous section shows the following result.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-PAC learner for k-UNION-GON
over examples from X2d with sample complexity
O
(
k
αǫ
log
(
1
α
)
log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
dk
β
log
1
α
))
.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we presented a computationally efficient differentially private PAC learner for simple
geometric concepts in the plane, which can be described as the union of polygons. Our results
extend to higher dimensions by replacing lines with hyperplanes, and triangles with simplices.
The running time, however, depends exponentially on the dimension. Our results also extend,
via linearization, to other simple geometric concepts whose boundaries are defined by low degree
polynomials, such as balls. In general, the dimension of the linearization depends on the degrees
of the polynomials. This motivates the open problem of improving the dependency of the running
time on the dimension of the problem.
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